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that the judiciary has included certain liberties in respect to commercial ac-
tivity-whether or not they promote ultimate peace and security-among the
rights whose claims to protection from interference are absolute;'4' and has
introduced further obstructions to the control of nationwide economic activities
through a geographical conception of "local" matters. 42 The result of the latter
conception has been the notion of "states' rights" which some groups in the
United States are now seeking to change by means of a redistribution of state
and federal powers.
It seems evident, however, from the fact that widely differing constitutional
provisions have been uniformly construed in such a way as to achieve laissez
faire-whether on grounds of "states' rights" or "freedom of trade" or "depri-
-cation of 'property' "--that the notion of "states' rights" is only one of the
difficulties to be overcome; and that a separation of personal from economic
interests is almost a condition precedent to an effective attack on laissezfaire.
It should be evident that any attempt to control economic matters, by redefini-
tion of states' rights or by any other method, is likely to meet with strong oppo-
sition based on the desire for security of personal interests.43 Whether this
resistance be encountered in the form of opposition to the adoption of the pro-
posal or in the form of judicial misconstruction after it is adopted, the ultimate
result is the same.
SCALING-DOWN OF ARREARAGES ON CUMULATIVE
PREFERRED STOCK
Ever since cumulative preferred stock came into fashion, common share-
holders have been faced with the dismalprospect produced by accumulations of
unpaid dividends so large that normal earnings cannot be expected to make up
past arrearages for many years. In such situations, unless some settlement can
be made with preferred shareholders, the value of the common shares as income-
yielding securities is very small. This problem is most acute at the end of a
period of business depression when common shareholders, actuated by a desire
to share in the profits of the more hopeful future, seek to effect a reorganization
of the capital structure of the corporation so as to reduce or eliminate the prior
141 See p. 627 supra. :42 See p. 629 supra.
r43 Thus a successful drive against the proposed child labor amendment proceeded by con-
vincing many farmers that their children would be unable to help on the farm if the amendment
were adopted. The Child Labor Amendment, 9 Social Serv. R. 107 (1935). The possibility of
such confusion arises in the ambiguity of the term "labor," which has both economic and per-
sonal significations. It can represent (i) a "commodity" which is sold and purchased; or (2)
any expenditure of energy in everyday activity. The experience of Australia with § 51 (xxxv)
suggests an alternative to a grant of power over some subject-matter, such as "conditions of
labor," "production," etc. If, instead, an amendment should grant power to govern the rela-
tions of certain classes of persons, and if the relations chosen to define these classes were eco-
nomic-e.g., "employers and employees" or "vendors and purchasers"--the ambiguity of the
principal terms might be partially eliminated.
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claims of the preferred and thus make some part of future profits available for
dividends on the common. If common shareholders are willing to give the
preferred new securities of sufficient value to compensate them for the relin-
quishment of their "contractual" rights, such an adjustment can equitably be
made.' But, of course, the common is anxious not to dilute its holdings any
more than is necessary, and most preferred shareholders can be induced to
accept a plan which falls short of full compensation. Difficulties, however, arise
when a dissenting minority attacks recapitalization as impairing rights guar-
anteed by their contract with the corporation. It is the purpose of this note to
discuss the devices by which accumulations can be scaled down, the justification
for such scaling down, the protection that has been accorded to preferred stock-
holders, and the means by which more effective protection may be granted.
I
A. CHARTER AMENDMENT
Since the rights of the shareholder are largely defined in the charter,2 the
most obvious means by which to modify these rights is by amendment of the
charter. Two types of amendment have been adopted with a view to a reduction
of accumulations; these may be called the direct and the indirect methods. 3
The direct method utilizes an amendment which frankly cancels the accumula-
tions.4 But all courts have refused to sanction such amendments because past
I For a discussion of the proper valuation of new securities, see Nichols, A Rationale of
Corporate Reorganizations (1936).
See Burk v. Ottawa Gas & Electric Co., 87 Kan. 6, 123 Pac. 857 (1912); Page v. Whitten-
ton Mfg. Co., 211 Mass. 424, 97 N.E. ioo6 (1912); Spear v. Rockland-Rockport Lime Co.,
113 Me. 285, 93 Adt. 754 (191S).
s See 46 Yale L.J. 985, 993 (1937).
4 In October, 1936, Federal Water Service Corporation, a Delaware corporation doing
business in New York, had a deficit of $r,233,875.5o. There were outstanding r59,269 shares of
preferred stock and 568,775 of Class A stock. The preferred was divided into $4, $6, $6.5o,
and $7 preferred. Dividend accumulations ranged from $33.25 on the $7 preferred to $9.67 on
the Class A. A proposed charter amendment offered to exchange for each share of $4 preferred,
four shares of a new Class A stock; for the $6 preferred, six shares; for the $6.5o, six and one-
half; for the $7, seven shares; and for the old Class A, one-half share of new Class A. Class B
(common) shareholders could purchase new Class A for $17 per share. The Class A stock was
entitled to all future earnings of the corporation except that after $2 per share had been paid
to the Class A, the B stock was to receive dividends not to exceed ic per share before any fur-
ther dividends were paid to Class A. In the event of dissolution, the Class A was entitled to
all the assets of the corporation except that after $20 per share was distributed to Class A,
Class B was to receive an amount not to exceed ic per share before any further distribution to
Class A. Voting control was to be in Class A. It is clear that the Class B shareholders relin-
quish all but a nominal interest in the corporation. However, the A group retains approxi-
mately a one-fifth interest in the corporation, considerably more than it appears to have on the
basis of the existing priorities. This is not a "voluntary" plan, but proposal to substitute the
new stock for the old by direct charter amendment requiring the exchange of shares. The
plan was set forth in a letter to the stockholders, signed by the president and dated October 23,
1936. It was abandoned after the decision in Keller v. Wilson, 19o Atl. xI5 (Del. 1936), dis-
cussed ifra p. 648. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1936, p. 4o.
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accumulations are said to be "vested rights" which cannot be taken away by
charter amendment.S Courts, however, have not extended the same protection
to the right to future accumulations and have sustained amendments wiping
them out.6 The conventional justification for this distinction has been that the
right to dividends that have matured is "vested '"7 is more tangible. However,
since the right to accumulations, past or future, is by contract given a prior
claim to future earnings, and since in either case it is designed to protect the
preferred shareholder against long periods of passed dividends, the distinction is
hardly justified by resort to the question-begging vested rights terminology.'
But the fact that the distinction has been drawn suggests the possibility that
some courts may prohibit scaling-down of past accumulations when there is a
surplus, but may permit the scaling-down when there is no surplus; a surplus,
making payment possible, makes the rights seem more substantial and more
"vested." Although no court has adopted this analysis, two New Jersey cases
indicate that scaling down of past accumulations will more readily be per-
mitted when there is no surplus.9
It appeared for a time that the 1922 amendment to § 26 of the Delaware
Corporation Lawo would be construed as changing the rule of the Morris case"
to permit direct scaling down. The pertinent part of the amended statute
reads: "Any corporation... may amend its charter.., by increasing or
decreasing its authorized capital stock or reclassifying the same, by changing
the number, par value, designations, preferences, or other special rights of the
shares.., or by making any other change or alteration which may be desired."x2
In Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., the federal court, in upholding an amend-
ment creating new prior preference stock, spoke as though this statute spe-
cifically included accumulations among the rights which could be changed by
5 Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., i4 Del. Ch. 136, 122 At]. 696 (1923); Lonsdale
Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine Corp., ioi N.J.Eq. 554, 139 AtI. 5o
(1927); Keller v. Wilson, igo Atl. ii5 (Del. 1936). This is not to say that such plans have not
gone into effect without court action.
6 Yoakum v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D.C. R.I. 1929); cf. Keller v.
Wilson, igo Atl. i5 (Del. 1936).
7 See note 6 supra. See also Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. Int. Mercantile Marine Co.,
xox N.J. Eq. 554, 139 Atl. 50 (1927).
9 That there is at best a hazy distinction between the various amendments held to be and
those held not to be violative of vested rights is indicated by the comparison of cases in
Curran, Minority Stockholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters, 32 Mich. L. Rev.
743 (I934). See also 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 139 (1936).
9 Cf. Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., 0x N.J. Eq. 543, 138 Atl. 772 (1927) (merger
effecting a scaling-down of accumulations was permitted on the ground of laches) with Colgate
v. U.S. Leather Co, 75 N.J. Eq. 229, 72 Atl. 126 (igog) (such merger, in the presence of a cor-
porate surplus, was enjoined).
"Del. Rev. Code 1935, § 2058.
14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (1923). "See note 6 supra.
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amendment. 3 And in Keller v. Wilson X4 the chancellor held that the statute
not only permitted direct scaling down of accumulations but could be applied
to stock issued before the statute was amended through the operation of the
reserved power clause. But the Delaware Superior Court declared that the
right to accumulations was a vested right which could not be destroyed by the
corporation under the authority of a statute passed subsequent to the issuance
of the securities. It went on to announce that the amended § 26 did not author-
ize the modification of the right to accumulations which is a vested right, i.e.,
something more than a special right.'5
The indirect method is to create a new class of stock prior to the old preferred
and the accumulations thereon. The new stock is offered in exchange for the old
stock and all accumulations. A little junior stock may be thrown in for good
measure."6 Amendments accomplishing this have been held to alter only
"preferences" and not "vested rights"; 7 they have been upheld by several
courts.,8 This practice scales down old accumulations unless the shareholders
who refuse to exchange their stock are granted as great a share in future profits
as they would have received had the amendment not been passed. 19 In the
recent case of In re Duer"2 such protection was refused. Since no statute has
been construed to permit direct scaling down and since the propriety of indirect
scaling down is a problem of statutory construction, it is difficult to see why
dissenters should not be protected from the devastating effect of new prior
preference stock.
B. MERGER, CONSOLIDATION, AND SALE OF COPORATE ASSETS
A method analogous to indirect scaling down by amendment is the transfer
of the enterprise to a different corporation" or combination with a different
x3 65 F. (2d) 332, 335 (C.C.A. 2d 1933), cerf. denied, 290 U.S. 673 (1933).
'4 i8o Atl. 584 (Del. Ch. 1935); 36 Col. L. Rev. 674 (1936); 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 327 (1936).
' 19o Atl. i55, ii9 (Del. 1936).
" See, for example, the 1936 plan of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.
'7 Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. (2d) 332 (C.C.A. 2d 1933), cerl. denied, 290 U.S.
673 (i933); cf. Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (1923).
18 See cases cited in note 13 supra; Hinckley v. Schwarzchild and Sulzberger Co., 107 App.
Div. 470, 95 N.Y.S. 357 (19o5); Salt Lake Automobile Co. v. Keith O'Brien Co., 45 Utah 218,
143 Pac. ioi5 (1914); General Investment Co. v. American Hide and Leather Co., 98 N.J. Eq.
326, 129 Atl. 244 (1925); Yoakum v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D.C. R.I.
1929). There is some indication that business men regard this device as a convenient alterna-
tive to direct scaling-down. See Stempf, Revamping Capital Structures, i6 Nat'l. Ass'n.
Accountant's Bull. 267, 277 (1934).
9 Such an amendment does not in itself disturb the old accumulations, but if they are to be
subordinated to future dividends on the new preferred, there is small likelihood that the ac-
cumulations will ever be paid. In order to fully protect dissenters they should be granted an
injunction against the payment of any new dividends until the accumulations are reduced b
an amount equal to their proper share of the new earnings if the new stock had not been issued.
2027o N.Y. 343, iN.E. (2d) 457 (I936). See 46 Yale L.J. 985, 997 (1937) for a discussion of
the complications arising from the attempt to prevent the subordination of the old preferred to
the new securities.
"For examples, see American Malt Corporation v. Board of P.U. Commissioners, 86 N.J.L.
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corporation. Such a transfer involves the exchanging of new securities for the
preferred stock and accumulations. In making the exchange, accumulations
may not be given proper recognition. The exchange can be effected by three
methods which will be illustrated by the use of the following example. Capital
surplus and reserves of the X corporation amount to $25,ooo. There are
accumulated dividends to the extent of $io on each share of preferred stock.
The board of directors of the X corporation, having secured the necessary
ratification by stockholders, agrees to merge with the X corporation which may
be either a corporation formed for the purpose of effecting a scaling-down or a
pre-existing corporation with a legitimate reason for merger. In return for each
share and accumulations, the preferred shareholders of Y are offered one share
of similar preferred stock in Y and one share of common stock. The common
stockholders receive common stock in Y at a ratio of 8 shares for one share of
X common.22
As a second possibility the two corporations may consolidate, forming a
third corporation Z, the plan of share purchase being the same as above.23
A third device for accomplishing the same thing is for the X corporation to
sell all its assets to the Y corporation in return for the stock of Y, the stock being
distributed to the shareholders of X in the same manner.24
Here, as where recapitalization is effected by charter amendment, the non-
668, 92 Ath. 362 (i914); United Milk Products Corporation v. Lovell, 75 F. (2d) 923 (C.C.A.
6th 1935). The plan which involves scaling-down of accumulations is discussed in Cravath,
Reorganizations of Corporations, included in Stetson, Some Legal Phases of Corporate Fi-
nancing, Reorganization, and Regulation (x927). See In re Interborough-Consol. Corp., 277
Fed. 455 (D.C. N.Y. 1921); Petry v. Harwood Electric Co., 250 Pa. 142, 124 Ath. 302 (1924);
Outwater v. Public Service Corp., io3 N.J.Eq. 461, 143 AtI. 729 (1928), aft'd, 2o4 N.J.Eq.
490, 146 At. 9z6 (1929); Purposes and Financial Plans of Industrial Reorganization, 7 Harv.
Bus. Rev. i96 (X929); Baker and Malott, Introduction to Corporate Finance 274-94 (1936).
The classic example of this device is the repeated recapitalization of what is now the United
States Leather Corporation. The history of this company is set forth in Dewing, Corporate
Promotions and Reorganizations (i914). See Colgate v. U.S. Leather Co. 73 N.J.Eq. 72, 67
Atl. 657 (1907), reversed, 75 N.J.Eq. 229, 72 Atl. 126 (2909); Windhurst v. Central Leather
Co., ioi N.J.Eq. 543, 138 At 772 (1927), aft'd, IO5 N.J.Eq. 621, 149 Atl. 36 (1930), aft'd, 107
N.J.Eq. 528, 153 Ath. 402 (1930); Prall v. U.S. Leather Co., 6 N.J.Misc. 967, 143 Atl.382 (1928),
aft'd, 2o5 N.J.L. 646, 146 AtI. 916 (1929). These materials are collected in Katz, Cases and
Materials on Corporate Readjustment and Reorganization 67 ff.
- While the ordinary merger plan is not so bold, this example illustrates the type of scaling-
down practised in the U.S. Leather and other cases cited in note 21 supra.
23 While the distinction between merger and consolidation seems purely legalistic (and for
our purposes the same problem is generally presented by both devices), the distinction gains
significance in some situations. See 45 Yale L.J. 105, 107 (1935); 30 Mich. L. Rev. io74
(1932).
24 Merger and consolidation are governed by statute and in many instances will be im-
possible. However, if the court is favorably inclined toward a particular consolidation, it will
permit it to pass if couched in terms of sale of assets. In Paterson v. Shattuck Arizona Copper
Co., z86 Minn. 61i, 244 N.W. 281 (1932), the court treated a consolidation as a sale of assets
in order to avoid statutory difficulties. See 8r U. of Pa. L. Rev. 219 (1932); 20 Calif. L. Rev.
42r (1932); 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 330 (1936).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
litigated cases present the economically important problem. The non-litigious
dissenter is faced with several unsatisfactory choices. He may sell his stock on
the market; he may, in many states, avail himself of an "appraisal statute" ;2S
or he may capitulate and accept the new securities offered him. In no case is he
given the choice of retaining the interest in the future earnings of the enterprise
to which his accumulated dividends supposedly entitle him.
Recapitalization may be either the sole purpose of a formal merger 6 or it may
be merely incidental to a genuine merger. In the former case, if litigation ensues,
consistency with the amendment cases would require a court to enjoin the
merger or the distribution of new securities without regard to the fairness of the
exchange. However, where there is a genuine merger, there must be some dis-
tribution of new securities, and the court's only purpose is to see that the dis-
tribution is fair, i.e., that proper recognition is given to the accumulations.
Courts, however, have not distinguished between these two situations and have
generally enjoined either the merger or the distribution on the ground that the
plan was unfair.27 MacFarlane v. North American Cement Corp.2s is the only
case found in which the court has, in the absence of laches, refused to enjoin a
plan on the ground of fairness alone. There, however, the finding of fairness is
probably attributable to the fact that the court attached excessive importance
to the bargaining power29 of the common stock.
The dissenting stockholder has also been denied injunctive relief when his
sThese statutes commonly provide that the dissenter is entitled to the "value" of his stock
which in many cases is less than the par value of the shares plus accumulations. These statutes
do not provide satisfactory remedies because the shareholder does not recover the investment
value of his securities.
See Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders under Appraisal Statutes, 45 Harv. L.
Rev. (1931); Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 Corn. L.Q.
420 (1930).
26 See the history of the U.S. Leather Co., note i5 supra.
'7 Colgate v. U.S. Leather Co., 75 N.J. Eq. 229, 72 Atl. 126 (i9o9); American Malt Corp. v.
Board of P.U. Commissioners, 86 N.J.L. 668, 92 Atl. 362 (x914); Lonsdale Securities Corp. v.
International Mercantile Marine Corp., ioi N.J.Eq. 554, x39 Atl. 5o (1927); Geiger v. Ameri-
can Seeding Machine Co., 124 Ohio St. 222, 177 N.E. 594 (193).
28 i6 Del. Ch. 172, 157 Atl. 396 (1928).
,9 The bargaining power of the common is only of significance when there is some necessity
for the change, as in the case of an insolvent corporation. See p. 65i infra. Here the merger was
with a more prosperous corporation, and therefore, as the court found, to the benefit of the
shareholders of the North American Cement Corp. But there is no good reason why a requisite
to such a merger should be an inequitable distribution of securities among the shareholders of
the benefited corporation. Therefore the following statement of the court seems an amazingly
frank recognition of the nuisance value of the common stock. "There could be no merger
without the vote of common stockholders in its favor, and that vote could probably not be
secured unless the merger plan was made attractive to them .... the conclusion must be
that the merger plan indicates good business judgment in the interest of the company rather
than such unfairness to any of its stockholders as amounts to fraud." MacFarlane v. N.A.
Cement Corp. i6 Del. Ch. 172, i8o, 157 At. 396, 399 (1928).
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action was untimely.30 The two relevant cases suggest nothing more definite
than that injunctive relief will be untimely if it is not sought before the pro-
ceedings under the plan are so advanced that an injunction would be destructive
of the interests of the assenting majority. Petry v. Harwood Electric Co.3x
suggests another technique by which the dissenters may be protected. In that
case the court, although denying injunctive relief, held that since merger effected
dissolution, the preferred shareholder could specifically enforce his contract
entitling him to a preference of par value plus accumulations upon dissolution.
Two subsequent cases, however, have failed to adopt the reasoning of the Petry
case.
3 2
Whenever the dissenter's interests are small, it is possible that a court which
would have denied injunctive relief because of laches or because the plan was
"fair" may nevertheless invoke the doctrine of the Petry case and grant specific
relief since such relief will cause less hardship to the new corporation. However,
when the dissenter's interests are large, specific relief might require so much cash
that it would harm the corporation more than injunctive relief, for injunc-
tive relief merely keeps the corporation in status quo, while, when specific relief
is given, the litigious preferred shareholders are entitled to full payment. Thus
where the dissenter's interests are large, defenses should be as available in a
suit for specific performance as they are when an injunction is sought.
C. EQUITY RECEIVERSHIPS AND SECTION 77B
Accumulated dividends have repeatedly been held not to constitute debts of
the corporation.33 A corporation solvent in the equity sense probably cannot
effect a reorganization through an equity receivership or under the Bankruptcy
Act. Thus these devices cannot be initiated by common stockholders to improve
their position at the expense of the preferred.34 When an insolvent corporation
goes through a reorganization, the relative rights of preferred and common
stockholders are matters of secondary interest. However, when a corporation,
the capital structure of which includes cumulative preferred is reduced to
insolvency, it is probable that there are dividend accumulations. The question
must then arise as to what recognition is to be given these accumulations in the
30 See Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., ioi N.J.Eq. 543 (1927); United Milk Products
Co. v. Lovell, 75 F. (2d) 923, 928 (i935).
3' 250 Pa. 142, 124 AtI. 302 (1924); see Simms, An Application of the Doctrine That Con-
solidation Effects Dissolution, 15 Va. L. Rev. 757 (1929).
32 United Milk Products Corporation v. Lovell, 75 F. (2d) 923 (2935); Windhurst v. Cen-
tral Leather Co., io7 N.J.Eq. 528, 153 Atl. 302 (1924).
33 Hamblock v. Clipper Lawn-mower Co., 148 Ill. App. 618 (igog); Ellsworth v. Lyons,
181 Fed. 55 (C.C.A. 6th igio); Booth v. Union Fibre Co., 137 Minn. 7, 162 N.W. 677 (1917);
Kennedy v. Carolina Public Service Co., 262 Fed. 8o3 (D.C. Ga. 1920); but see Roberts v.
Roberts-Wicks Co., 184 N.Y. 257, 77 N.E. 13 (i9o6).
34 Accumulations are not a basis for the initiation of proceedings under § 77B. In re
Picadilly Realty Co., 78 F. (2d) 257 (C.C.A. 7th 1935).
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distribution of new securities. If the matter weretreated on the basis of absolute
priorities, there would be nothing left for either class of shareholders, but as a
practical matter in order to preserve the debtor corporation as a going concern,
the necessary coiperation of the junior security holders is obtained by allo-
cating some interest to them.35 In order to obtain the approval of the equity
courts, the great majority of which take jurisdiction over reorganization
plans,s6 or to satisfy the requirements of the Bankruptcy Act,37 the allocation
of securities must be in accordance with a "fair plan."38 Although there is no
formula for a fair plan, this means, at least, that after the creditors have been
satisfied, the interest left to the stockholders must be divided so that the
preferred will receive somewhat more than the common. The exact ratio will be
determined by the bargaining power of the representatives of the opposing
interests.39 In these negotiations the existence of accumulations may have some
effect.
Despite the apparent preponderance of cases protecting dividend accumula-
tions against scaling-down, a great many corporations have succeeded in doing
away with dividend arrearage. 40 The difficulty of organizing an effective
opposition, the lack of adequate information, and the expense of litigation-the
familiar allies of management in intra-corporate disputes4 -keep many recapi-
talization plans out of the courts.
Thus we see that the security afforded by preferred stock is far less than
appears on the face of the contract. The sophisticated investor knows this, but
it seems that "widows and orphans" should be given greater protection or some
warning of the real significance of the cumulative provision.
II
It is to be expected that disappointed common phareholders will seek to
rearrange the capital structure of a corporation for the purpose of realizing at
least a part of the anticipated returns. But some degree of speculation is
implicit in the very nature of their investment. Preferred shareholders, on the
other hand, accept at the outset the prospect of comparatively modest dividends
in return for what they suppose is a greater measure of security. For this they
35See Bonbright and Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights, 28 Col. L. Rev.
127 (1928).
36 See Katz, Protection of Minority Bondholders, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 517, 527 (1936);
4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 675.
37 Bankruptcy Act § 77B(b), 48 Stat. 912 (1934); ii U.S.C.A. § 207(b) (1936).
38 See Spaeth and Friedberg, Early Developments under § 77B, 30 Ill. L. Rev. 137, 154 ff.
(i935); Gerdes, A Fair Plan of Corporate Reorganization, 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. i (i934); 35
Col. L. Rev. 391 (193S).
39 See Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Reorganization, 44 Yale L.J. 923 (i935).
40 See Dewing, The Financial Policy of Corporations 55, 1248 ff. (3d ed. 1934).
4 Berle and Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property 8o ff. (1932); Weiner,
Payment of Dissenting Stockholders, 27 Col. L. Rev. 547, 564 (1927).
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have expressly contracted. Thus any discussion as to the proper extent to
which scaling-down should be permitted presupposes that there is some justifica-
tion for the practice beyond the desire (and apparent ability) of the common
shareholders to enrich themselves at the expense of the contractual rights of the
preferred. Several rather unreal arguments have been advanced to this end.
It is said that a majority of shareholders have assented, and that the will of
the majority should not be thwarted by the obstinance of a recalcitrant minor-
ity.42 What better argument for the desirability of the change could there be
than the approval of a large majority of the affected class? Several factors,
however, seem to destroy the force of this argument. First of all, it frequently
occurs that a large number of preferred shares are controlled by persons who are
also interested in the common stock. Such persons are adequately compensated
for any depreciation in the value of the preferred shares by a corresponding or
greater appreciation of the common. Obviously, their approval is no evidence
of the desirability of the plan from the standpoint of owners of preferred stock
alone. Nevertheless, courts have minimized the significance to be attached to
the articulation of common and preferred interests.43 Secondly, the manage-
ment of the ordinary corporation holds more common than preferred stock" and
will mobilize sentiment in favor of the plan by the literature distributed in the
solicitation of proxies, and paid for with corporate funds. On the other hand the
considerable initiative and expense required for proxy solicitation generally
prevents the marshaling of an effective opposition.4S
It has also been said that the presence of accumulations leads the common
stock interests to influence the management to take unwise chances with a
view of improving the financial position of the corporation by making large
42 Stevens, Corporations 495 (x936); see note 22 supra.
43 In MacFarlane v. North American Cement Corp., i6 Del. Ch. 172, i8o, 157 Atl. 396, 399
(1928): "..... it is insisted by the complainants that the fact that almost one-half of the pre-
ferred stockholders .... voted in favor of the merger is of no evidentiary value in determin-
ing whether the proposed plan is fair .... because they were actuated by a selfish motive,--
they had a large amount of common stock ..... Conceding the vote .... to be of little
evidentiary value .... it cannot be assumed that the motive actuating such vote was en-
tirely selfish."
44 Berle and Means list the stockholdings by management in 1922 in twenty-six industries,
including thousands of corporations. In seventeen of the twenty-six a greater percentage of
common than preferred was held, and in all industries the par value of the common shares
held by the management was substantially greater than that of the preferred. Berle and
Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property 51 (1932).
4s In this connection, the commentator in 46 Yale L. J. 985, 1003 (1937), doubting the feasi-
bility of administrative control of the plan itself, recommends more stringent rules governing
the information to be given in the solicitation of proxies. Undoubtedly such regulation would
reduce the number of shareholders who would assent against their own interests, but it would
not take care of the investor who is willing to sign anything. In most cases a careful reading
of the literature now distributed will disclose the effect of the proposed plan. See for example,
the Federal Water Corp. plan, note 4 supra.
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speculative profits.46 Scaling-down, on the other hand, will be conducive to a
wise conservatism in the management of the corporate affairg. However,
although this may be true once financial difficulties have arisen, the knowledge
by management that the payment of accumulated arrearages may be avoided
may lead it to indulge in unwise speculation even before financial difficulties
have arisen. For the benefits of successful speculation go primarily to the
common shareholders, whereas losses will result in an inability to meet pre-
ferred dividends. If these passed dividends need not be made up out of future
earnings, the common stockholders are in effect gambling with the money of the
preferred; they have more to gain than to lose by daring ventures.47
Another argument urged is that the corporation as a whole will receive the
benefits of the plan,4 or the argument is restated by saying that the capital
structure will be put on a basis more economically sound.49 In the main such an
argument should apIal to the preferred shareholder only if he is going to
profit from the plan. If the plan wilf result in an uncompensated scaling-down
of the interests of the ireferred shareholders, it is misleading to speak about the
interest of the corporation as a whole, or the soundness of the capital structure.
The argument would have some cogency if it could be pointed out that the
rearrangement would result in increased profitsso In this regard, it is some-
times said that the elimination of the obligation to the preferred shareholders
will increase the credit of the corporation. It is difficult to see how this can be
true since prospective creditors should realize that the existence of dividend
accumulations in no way endangers them. It is possible, however, that after
scaling-down, creditors will be less reluctant to lend because of the lessened
likelihood of unwise dividend distributions to preferred stockholders by manage-
ment aware that accumulations must be paid off before common stockholders
can share in the earnings. A somewhat more persuasive argument is available
where the corporation is in need of new capital.s' Again, as in the case of
46 Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Reorganization, 44 Yale L. J. 923, 931 (1935).
47 Ibid.
48 MacFarlane v. North American Cement Corp., i6 Del. Ch. 172, 157 Atl. 396 (1928),
noted in 45 Harv. L. Rev. 930 (1932); Cf. Colby v. Equitable Trust Co., 124 App. Div. 262,
io8 N.Y.S. 978 (1908).
49 The letter of Sept. 26, z936, to the stockholders of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.
urged the acceptance of a "fair and financially sound plan which would .... recognize the
rights of the respective classes of stock and strengthen the capital structure of the Company."
so Although increased profits would not increase the amount of dividends payable to the
preferred, the result might be the availability of earned surplus which would never have existed
had the improvement not taken place, and therefore an increase in the amount actually paid
to the preferred.
S1 This is ordinarily true only where the corporation is in real financial embarrassment, and
in such cases some scaling-down is to be expected. See p. 651 supra. If the new capital is
needed for expansion, the investment should be sufficiently attractive to secure new capital
without scaling-down.
NOTES
ordinary creditors, the existence of arrearages has no effect on new securities
which rank ahead of the old preferred stock. Nevertheless, the psychological
effect of eliminating accumulations will probably make new prior securities
more salable. Recapitalization, also, may simplify current financing by per-
mitting distribution of current earnings to more than one class of security
holders. Since this will enable the corporation to issue more of the old types of
securities the corporation may be able to obtain new capital without complica-
ting the capital structure by issuance of new types of securities.s2
However, insofar as the scaling-down gives a false color to the financial
history and prospects of the corporation, it should not be encouraged. But
frequently, a corporation while not insolvent may be in such a condition that it
cannot hope to raise new capital from outside sources, but must look to the
existing shareholders from whom, in any case, new funds can be raised with a
minimum of promotional expense. It is argued that the common stockholders
will not participate unless they are offered some inducement, such as the
elimination of accumulations~S And since preferred shareholders may be un-
willing to make a speculative investment, and, also, since the amount of
preferred stock outstanding is ordinarily comparatively sfilall, the only possi-
bility of raising the needed capital may be to induce the common shareholders
to participate. This argument seems to have persuasive force only in those rare
situations where there is a concurrence of the following factors: a real prospect
that new capital will increase earnings to such an extent that preferred stock-
holders will be compensated for the relinquishment of their accumulations, and
the unavailability of new capital at better terms from any source other than
common shareholders.
It is also possible that scaling-down may be justifiable when it is necessary in
order to retain active managers whose services are necessary to the continued
prosperity of the business. It is conceivable that sizable blocks of common stock
are held by the men whose executive ability and ability to get contracts through
goodwill are essential to the successful operation of the enterprise. Suppose
that the common shareholders have not been sharing in the profits because of
the existence of dividend arrearages on the preferred. The active managers
become impatient and threaten to take their talents elsewhere unless the
accumulations are scaled down. In a case where the ability of these men is
absolutely essential to the future success of the business and for some reason
the matter cannot be handled by salary and/or bonus adjustments, it may be
advisable for the preferred to capitulate. But such rare cases should stand on
their own facts and do not argue for scaling down as a general policy.
S2 The desirability of raising capital by the sale of stocks rather than securities carrying
fixed capital charges is pointed out in Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations 946-47 (3d. ed.
1934).
S This argument is advanced with reference to stockholders generally as against creditors
in Swaine, Reorganization through Judicial Proceedings, included in Some Legal Phases of
Corporate Financing, 8 Lectures on Legal Topics 133, 154 (193).
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III
We have seen that the traditional handicaps of minority security holders
operate to keep many plans out of court. The only machinery thus far developed
to insure court approval of reorganization plans which does not require dis-
senters to take the initiative is the administration of insolvent corporations by
the bankruptcy and equity courts. The prevalence of scaling down apart from
bankruptcy despite numerous adverse decisions and despite the absence of any
persuasive justification suggests the adoption of legislation vesting in the state
courts of equity a similar supervisory power over "voluntary" plans of re-
capitalization by amendment and merger.54 Such legislation would require that
recapitalization plans be approved by the court before being submitted to the
stockholders. The advantage of this system is that the court, without throwing
the burden of instituting litigation upon dissenters, would have the opportunity
to scrutinize the plan and to withhold approval if preferred shareholders were
dealt with unfairly. The added burden placed upon the courts by such legisla-
tions would be justified only if courts would seize the opportunity to strike
down unfair plans even in the absence of strong opposition. Although under
77B plans have not been rejected unless strongly opposed,56 several factors
indicate that courts may adopt a stricter attitude in regard to scaling down by
solvent corporations. Scaling-down plans are relatively simple and do not in-
volve the interests of many classes of security holders. Furthermore, the courts
in the past have been antagonistic to scaling-down. Most important of all,
there is not the necessity, as in the case of insolvent corporations, that some plan
be adopted. The withholding of court approval would obviously not prevent
the voluntary exchange of old securities for new so long as the interests of
dissenters were preserved, but such withholding would warn prospective
assenters of existing unfairness and would act as a prophylaxis against and a
corrective of unfair plans. In the interests of a less complex corporate structure,
it would probably be desirable for the statute to compel dissenters to join in a
fair plan. But the retroactive application of such a statute to prior issued
securities would probably raise constitutional difficulties.57
Of course such a statute would not indicate what is a fair plan. There has
been much speculation as to the nature of a fair plan under § 77B,58 but the less
S4 For similar Canadian legislation see § 112 of the dominion Corporation Act; Fraser
Reorganization of Companies in Canada, 27 Col. L. Rev. 932, 951 ff. (1927). Such supervisory
power has been recommended for other purposes. See 44 Yale L. J. 1025, 1049 (935); 36 Col.
L. Rev. 674, 675 (1936).
ss See 46 Yale L. J. 985, oo3 (1937).
s6 See Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Corporate Reorganization, 44 Yale L. J. 923, 929
(1935); Bonbright and Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights, 28 Col. L. Rev.
127, 145 (1928).
S7 See Geiger v. American Seeding Machine Co., 124 Ohio 222, 239, 177 N.E. 594, 6oo
(93i).
s8 See note 38 supra.
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pressing need for recapitalization renders the same considerations inapplicable
here. It should be held that scaling-down of accumulations is justifiable only
where it results in the benefits to the preferred shareholders discussed above.
Too much consideration should not be given to the improbability that accruals
will ever be paid,9 or broad and unsubstantiated statements concerning benefits
to the corporation as a whole.
It has also been suggested that recapitalization could be more effectively
supervised by an administrative board. ° Commissioner Douglas of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission recently announced that the Commission will ask
for power to regulate, among other things, reorganization proceedings. 6' It
might be a desirable substitute for state action to authorize the Securities
Exchange Commission to supervise recapitalization to the extent that such
supervision would be constitutional. In the absence of legislation providing for
supervision by court or administrative board, the protection of accumulations,
like other problems of minority security holders, must await either the creation
of an association like the British Shareholders Protective Association,62 or a
changed business morality.
Commentators have pointed out the undesirability of non-cumulative pre-
ferred stock.63 That this feeling is shared by the investing public is evidenced
by the fact that such securities are not highly regarded on the market.14 We
have seen that in many instances the cumulative provision is not only of no
practical value, but is misleading. Therefore, unless the accumulations are
fully protected, the desirability of any type of preferred stock as an investment
is doubtful.
INDUSTRIAL STRIKEBREAKING-THE BYRNES ACT
Articulate opinion of industrial strikebreaking has been almost unanimously
hostile.' There is now little question of the desirability of government inter-
ference if a law can be drawn which is both constitutional and effective. In its
broadest sense strikebreaking has taken three principal forms: (i) Replace-
ments. The most nearly justifiable form. Employers insist that they are merely
s9 See Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., ioi N.J. Eq. 543, 138 AtI. 772 (1927).
6o See 46 Yale L. J. 985, ioo3 (i937).
61 Chicago Tribune, April i8, I937, pt. 2, p. 7, col. 6.
62 See Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1305, 1330 (1934).
63 See Lattin, Is Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock in Fact Preferred, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 148,
64 (1930); 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 6o5, 6o8 (1926). But see Berle, Non-Cumulative Preferred
Stock, 23 Col. L. Rev. 358 (1923).
64 Professor Berle has called non-cumulative stock the "waif of the stock exchanges." Berle,
op. cit. supra note 63, at 358.
x See, generally, 85 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 406 (1937); Levinson, I Break Strikes (1935), ii
Fortune $6 (Jan. 1935), 90 New Republic 227 (Mar. 31, 1937). But see Pinkerton, Strikers,
Communists, Tramps, and Detectives (1878).
